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1Abstract
The comparative study of debt and fiscal consolidation has acquired a new focus with 
the re-emergence of debt as a major problem consequent upon the global financial 
crisis. This leads us to re-evaluate the literature on fiscal consolidation that flourished 
during the 1980s and 1990s. We identify two broad schools of analysis, one which 
segments episodes of fiscal change into discrete observations, the other comparing 
budget profiles at two points in time. We argue that both strategies miss the dynamic 
features of government strategy, especially in the choices made between expenditure-
based and revenue-based fiscal consolidation strategies. We propose a focus on 
pathways rather than episodes of adjustment, to recapture what Pierson terms ‘politics 
in time’. We draw on classical explanatory tools of comparative political economy, 
including structures of interest intermediation, the role of ideas in shaping the set of 
feasible policy choices, and the situation of national economies in the international 
political economy. We support our argument with qualitative data based on paired 
comparisons of Ireland and Britain, and Greece and Spain.
2Introduction
Fiscal consolidation emerges as a problem for European societies in different forms 
over time. The imperative of domestic stabilization in the aftermath of the crises of the 
1970s meant that deficit reduction policies dominated the political agenda during the 
1980s. During the 1990s, the politics of fiscal discipline was given additional impetus 
by the adoption by many countries of the Maastricht convergence criteria, which placed 
debt exposure centre-stage. The combination of increasing capital mobility and the 
institutionalisation of macroeconomic discipline at both the national and EU levels was
supposed to enforce good governance in the management of fiscal affairs. However, the 
disciplines required to qualify for EMU were not necessarily maintained once the Euro 
was adopted. Country-specific targets for a one-off qualification decision were replaced 
by common-pool obligations with more diffuse sanctions, and spread over iterated 
budget processes. Moreover, the current economic downturn is putting immense and 
unexpected pressure on governments’ fiscal balances. As a result, fiscal deficits in many 
European countries are likely to reach unprecedented levels in the near future. Fiscal 
adjustment is bound to become, once again, an urgent political priority for many 
countries over the next decade.
One of the central issues in fiscal consolidation concerns the composition of the 
adjustment, that is, whether governments seek to reduce deficits and cut debts by raising 
taxes or cutting expenditure, or indeed relying on growth to lift the public finances out 
of difficulty. Despite commonality in pressures and incentives, we observe a great deal 
of variation not only in countries’ performance at any one moment, but in the trajectory 
of change over time. Even when the combination of external and domestic factors
enforced a low-deficit equilibrium, the process can be characterized as a non-convergent 
convergence. As McNamara argues, the rule-based constraint of EMU and the market-
based constraint of the global economy have induced overall convergence in budget-
deficit levels, but have produced ‘neither a race to the bottom nor a convergence in the 
composition of fiscal policy’ (McNamara 2003, p.333). European countries achieved
balanced budgets in the late 1990s by following different pathways of fiscal 
consolidation. 
3However, this has not been fully accounted for in the existing literature. Two main 
comparative analytical strategies prevail. The dominant trend is work by economists 
such as Alesina and Perotti, and political scientists such as Hallerberg and von Hagen, 
among others. This breaks countries’ experiences into multiple discrete episodes of 
fiscal consolidation, measured in terms of change in the fiscal situation between one 
time period and the next (Alesina and Perotti 1995a; Hallerberg et al. 2007; Perotti 
1998). This research strategy has generated important insights into the main 
determinants of the stability and duration of fiscal consolidation strategies, and has 
yielded useful hypotheses to guide further research endeavour.  The recent work of 
Mulas-Granados is perhaps the most thorough and sophisticated contribution to this 
literature, drawing on an extensive range of economic, political, and institutional 
explanatory variables (Mulas-Granados 2006). An alternative approach is that adopted 
by Frank Castles and his colleagues, where the strategy is to compare observations at
two points in time (Castles 2007a). The principal emphasis here is on change in the 
main components of public spending, particularly shifts in social transfer spending on 
the one hand and non-transfer spending on the other; and shifts in the size of the deficit 
and volume of accumulated debt. This innovative work provides an alternative set of 
insights into the choices made across countries in deciding where the weight of 
adjustment is to fall, across the range of spending commitments of modern 
governments. Again, this analytical strategy relies upon quantitative indicators and 
formal analysis to evaluate explanations.
This paper takes issue with both of these standard ways of analysing the politics of 
fiscal consolidation. Firstly, we wish to renew the question of how best to capture the 
dynamics of countries’ adjustment paths. Breaking down the dependent variable into 
discrete episodes of fiscal adjustment yields large numbers of observations. But some 
countries have many of these episodes, others have relatively few. Not only is fiscal 
discipline institutionalized in different ways across countries, but the underlying 
propensity to incur debt exposure appears to vary too. We need to understand 
trajectories across time as well as episodes within time or comparisons of two points in 
time. Situating ‘politics in time’ is a demanding but necessary research agenda (Pierson 
2004). Secondly, we find it useful to remember that budgetary politics is not only a 
4function of the institutional design of the political system, or of the technical incentives 
and constraints facing decision-makers. It is also at the heart of politics itself (Levi 
1988; Skocpol 1985; Steinmo 1993). How and to what degree taxes are raised is at the 
core of political life; how the fiscal bargain is struck between who pays and who 
benefits is the very stuff of democracy itself. Budgets are therefore inseparable from 
distributive politics, broadly conceived. How potentially conflicting interests are 
organized and represented, how and to what degree they are inserted into the decision-
making process, may be vitally important for understanding the process as well as the 
outcome of fiscal adjustment strategies. We accept that institutional design is central to 
explaining variations in policy outcomes. But we wish to bring interests back into the 
frame too. Thirdly, we find ourselves dissatisfied with standardization of some
explanatory variables, necessary though this may be for quantitative analysis. This is 
especially important when we seek to explain outcomes with reference to government 
composition. Aggregate indicators of government partisanship must presume that ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ have an invariant meaning over time. But the dominant ideas shaping party 
priorities, and the set of feasible policy options perceived by governments, have 
changed quite markedly over time. We think it is important to probe more deeply into 
the meaning of partisanship for policy choice, not only across countries but also within 
a single country over time. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Firstly, we review the literature on the 
economic and political determinants of fiscal consolidation with a view to identifying 
some key analytical gaps. Secondly, we outline alternative perspectives on political 
strategy over time, and propose a new explanatory strategy. Thirdly, we present a case-
study analysis to illustrate some of our key arguments.  
The political economy of fiscal consolidations
Three main lines of research can be identified in the literature on the economic, political 
and institutional sources of fiscal adjustment in European and OECD countries. The 
first generation of research opened up debt as an issue, and looked at the politico-
institutional determinants of the government budgets, seeking to explain the sources of 
fiscal deficits (Alesina and Perotti 1995b; Grilli et al. 1991b; Roubini and Sachs 1989).
5Building on new political economy, this literature studied the role of economic and 
political institutions in shaping the incentives policy-makers face. For example, Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini assessed the relationship between government attributes and 
the accumulation of public debt in 18 OECD countries. They found that the 
accumulation of large public debts is concentrated among countries characterized by 
representative democracies as opposed to majoritarian parliamentary and presidential 
democracies, and among countries with fractionalized party systems. A key mechanism 
inducing suboptimal public financial policies, by this account, is the existence of short-
lived governments (Grilli et al. 1991a; Grilli et al. 1991b). 
A second body of work, which we might term the ‘consolidation matters’ approach, 
focuses on the macroeconomic and political effects of adopting alternative consolidation 
strategies (Alesina et al. 1998a; McDermott and Wescott 1996; Perotti 1996). This 
literature distinguishes between revenue-based and expenditure-based adjustments. 
Some quite strong claims emanate from this literature. Alesina and colleagues, for 
example, claimed that ‘fiscal corrections relying mostly on spending cuts that are 
concentrated on government wages and transfers tend to be expansionary, whereas those 
relying mainly on tax increases are contractionary’. They also find that the political 
costs to governments arising from expenditure cuts are minimal: they argue that there 
‘no evidence of a systematic electoral penalty or fall in popularity for governments that 
follow restrained fiscal policies’ (Alesina et al. 1998b, p.198; Alesina and Wacziarg 
1998).
These rather counterintuitive findings have significant policy implications. Spending-
based consolidations might not only produce positive economic outcomes (through non-
Keynesian effects), but may also be rewarded by voters. Not surprisingly then, the case 
for expansionary fiscal adjustments (EFAs) has been quite popular in certain epistemic 
communities and policy circles (Alesina et al. 1998a; European Commission 2007; 
Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; Perotti 1996). The argument that revenue-increasing 
approaches to reducing budget deficits were more likely to fail, and that the only 
reliable budget consolidation strategy was one based on cutting expenditure, was 
consistent with a conservative political preference for small government. Indeed, the 
fiscal constraints expected to be institutionalized by the Stability and Growth Pact were 
6positively welcomed by some. Alesina et al., for example, wrote: ‘hopefully, the 
Stability Pact will force serious welfare reforms’ (Alesina and Ardagna 1998, p.517).  
However, the case may not be as simple as at first argued. More recent research 
questions the conclusion that only a strategy based on expenditure will be durable and 
effective – a strategy based on revenue-raising can also have successful outcomes over 
time (Mulas-Granados 2003, pp.19-20, 34-5). Moreover, the argument that cutting 
spending is a politically cost-free exercise has also been empirically challenged: 
expenditure-cutting strategies appear to have more marked negative electoral 
consequences than had previously been shown (Mulas-Granados 2004). 
A third stream of research focuses on the economic and political determinants of the 
choice of consolidation strategy. For example, Von Hagen and Strauch argue that 
economic conditions such as the cyclical position of the domestic economy, the stance 
of monetary policy, the sustainability of government’s financial position, and the state 
of the international political economy affect the choice of consolidation strategy (von 
Hagen et al. 2002). Political institutions shape government choices too. Mulas-Granados 
argues that strategies of adjustment are a function of the fragmentation of decision-
making, the ideology of party in government, and the timing of elections (Mulas-
Granados 2003; 2006). Constitutional forms of government and types of electoral 
system have attracted renewed attention from others too (Cheibub 2006; Fabrizio and 
Mody 2006; Gali and Perotti 2003; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Persson and Tabellini 
2003, chapters 6 and 8; Poterba 1994; Poterba and von Hagen 1999). Finally, 
international political economy approaches have been also applied to explain patterns of 
fiscal stabilization in Europe (Freitag and Sciarini 2001; McNamara 2003).  
Most analysts find that the institutional fragmentation of decision-making makes 
countries deficit-prone. The explanation is generally cast in terms of a common-pool
problem (Weingast et al. 1981). In the context of large, fragmented and heterogeneous 
coalitions, interest groups that benefit from particular strands of public spending have 
more incentives to free ride on others’ contributions, which leads to high deficits and 
the accumulation of debt. Fragmented government depresses fiscal performance
7(Fabrizio and Mody 2006; Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002; Poterba 1994; Roubini and 
Sachs 1989).
Another source of variation in fiscal policies on which there is wide-ranging agreement 
is government partisanship. Partisan explanations posit that political parties adopt 
distinctive economic strategies depending on their redistributive consequences, and this 
persists even in the context of increasing international capital mobility (Boix 1998; 
Garrett 1998). Thus Mulas-Granados argues that the ideology of parties in government 
has become the most powerful predictor of fiscal policies and strategies of adjustment. 
He shows that socialist or left-wing governments are inclined to use balanced budgets to 
finance supply-side policies of capital formation and to maintain public expenditure, 
and are reluctant to cut these expenditures even at the expense of public consumption 
and transfers. In contrast, conservative or right-wing governments focus on cutting 
primary spending (including both social transfers and public wages, and public 
investment), using these savings to fund reductions in direct taxation for business and 
individuals. Thus social-democratic governments usually implement, ceteris paribus, 
revenue-based strategies of deficit reduction, while conservative governments tend to 
prefer expenditure-based ones (Castles 2007b; c; Mulas-Granados 2006). 
However, this literature is not without its limitations. The central problem of fiscal 
consolidation tends to be conceptualized in narrowly technical terms, and the 
explanatory variables are, of necessity, ones that can easily be quantified. As a 
consequence, the literature tends to miss what we normally recognize as core issues in 
political economy – issues about the distribution of pain in adjustment strategies, the 
extent of government engagement with major social actors, government’s capacity to 
choose and implement one option over another, and the electoral considerations that 
underlie this. Furthermore, the slide from a positive to a normative stance is not 
uncommon in the literature. Policy prescriptions have been drawn that can have wide-
ranging consequences for distributive outcomes. But these are not as well-founded as 
one might at first think.
8A new approach to analysing fiscal adjustment
Political economy is about decision-making under constraints. But the nature of these 
constraints, where they come from, and how they evolve over time may be 
conceptualized quite differently by different schools of political economy (Caporaso 
and Levine 1992). Indeed some scholars explicitly view modern political economy as 
the application of economic methodology to political processes (Drazen 2000). We 
would argue for a more ambitious theoretical perspective that would seek a real 
integration of the substantive concerns of economics and politics (Alt and Chrystal 
1983; Gourevitch 1986; Hall 1986). There is scope for a methodologically pluralistic 
approach that would draw on insights from different traditions in political economy and 
comparative politics, including approaches grounded in historical institutionalism, the 
varieties of capitalism literature, and comparative political economy (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Kahler and Lake 2003; Pierson and Skocpol 2002). With these ideas in mind, this 
section identifies some of the analytical gaps of empirical studies on fiscal consolidation
and proposes a new approach for explaining patterns of fiscal adjustments.
Locating strategic political choice in time
Taking time seriously requires us to think about three aspects of political choice. Firstly, 
governments must choose what to do about fiscal deficits under conditions of constraint. 
But the current range of options is strongly conditioned by what has gone before: 
politics is path-dependent. We need to find ways of capturing the real constraints 
shaping government options, and not bundle them into a black box of lagged effects, or 
country fixed effects. Secondly, the meaning of party politics may change quite 
considerably, and it may be misleading to treat partisanship as time-invariant. For 
example, the policy priorities of the British Labour Party in 1977 were not the same as 
those of 1997 or even 2007. And thirdly, the framework of received ideas, of 
assumptions about what works and what is politically necessary, is not a constant. The 
horizon of meaning that decision-makers bring to bear on the set of feasible options 
available to them has to be captured realistically. 
The implication of taking time seriously in this way is that the conventional approach of 
identifying discrete episodes of consolidation, while gaining methodological leverage 
9through quantitative formalization, loses analytical leverage and misses important 
shadings of meaning. Episodes of fiscal consolidation are not experienced in real time
as independent and unrelated events. Conventional methodologies cannot deal with the 
sequencing of decisions, policy learning, or the institutionalisation of policy solutions. 
In order to overcome this problem, we need to go beyond the analysis of episodes and 
begin to look at the politics shaping pathways of fiscal consolidation.
Bridging the gap between rational-choice and historical institutionalism
Institutions matter; but the way they affect policy outcomes needs to be explored 
further. A quantitative modelling approach can report correlations between variables, 
but offers little insight into how institutions shape actors’ choices. Many authors agree 
that the fragmentation of fiscal decision-making weakens the prospects for fiscal 
stabilization. But there is a real danger of conceptual stretching here (Sartori 1970). A 
single concept may be asked to do too much work, conflating the effects of a range of 
underlying political processes. Indeed, Perotti recognised that ‘fragmentation’ captures
not only formal institutional structures, but also the informal processes leading the 
negotiation in government, coalition and parliaments (political fragmentation) and the 
bargaining of fiscal policy between government and interest groups (social 
fragmentation) (Perotti 1998).
Rational-choice institutionalism has strong affinities with the economists’ approach to 
modelling interactions. Institutions are created by those with bargaining power to
establish the rules of the game (North 1990; 1994). But institutions are typically neither 
rationally designed nor optimally efficient. There is scope for complementing rational-
choice institutionalism with a historical institutionalist approach, the better to be able to 
analyse how cross-national variations in institutional structure may have a systematic 
effect on shaping the patterns of interaction between political actors (Hall 1997; Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Swank 2002).
Taking interests seriously
Government decisions are shaped by many factors including electoral pressures and 
lobbying activities. Equally, governments’ capacity to implement policy effectively may 
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be constrained by the nature and intensity of the linkages between state institutions and 
organized interests (Pierson 2001; Weiss 1998). The role of organized interests in 
general, and of the politics of wage negotiation in particular, is neglected in many 
political economy analyses. It can be difficult to assess the real influence of competing 
interests in the context of collective action problems, unequal access to power and 
endogenous preference formation. Quite often, the analytical power of interest group 
politics is sacrificed to a kind of institutionalist imperialism. The literature tends to
focus on mechanisms of intermediation, but clearly overlooks the interest dimension. 
With Pontusson, we believe that there is a case for ‘putting institutions in their place 
and taking interests seriously’ (Pontusson 1995). 
Interest-based explanations have been used to explain cross-national variations in 
economic policies. Gourevitch, for example, shows that the balance of power among 
societal actors shapes national policy responses to international economic crises
(Gourevitch 1986). Similarly, Pierson argues that the interests of employers and trade 
unions must be taken into account in analysing the politics of welfare state restructuring
(Pierson 2001). Sectoral interests are also an important source of variation in monetary 
and exchange rate policies (Frieden 1991; Posen 1995). The process of budget 
consolidation has far-reaching distributive consequences, affecting the material interests 
of powerful actors. These interests may be mobilized either to promote or to resist 
consolidation strategies. The mechanisms whereby governments are able to implement 
fiscal adjustment strategies may be powerfully conditioned by the profile of organized 
interests in a society, and by the degree to which they are institutionally embedded in 
consultative and decision-making processes. Whether or not organized interests can or 
choose to act as veto players over government choices, whether they are drawn into 
cost-restraining agreements or social pacts, and whether or not these entail high 
additional fiscal side-payments, may make a crucial difference to the possibility of 
implementing a spending-based or revenue-based adjustment strategy (Hardiman and 
Murphy 2008). 
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Partisanship and electoral politics
Political parties have the power to pursue quite distinctive economic policies, as they 
seek to accommodate and represent the demands of different distributional cleavages 
(Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rueda 2007). But there are problems with existing partisan 
explanations of strategies of fiscal consolidation. One issue is that of measurement, 
where a variable for partisanship is specified as the percentage of total cabinet posts 
held by social democratic and other left parties. But this does not capture ideological 
realignments within parties over time, differences of policy preferences between parties 
of the same ideological family across nations, or differential influence on cabinet 
decision-making. Another issue is that of turnover. If parties alternate in power 
regularly, more policy continuity may be expected, but if they have longer uninterrupted 
stretches in government, their capacity to shape distinctive policies may be increased; 
the sequencing of governments matters.
Quantitative analysis of episodes of fiscal consolidation argues that the proximity of 
elections is important in explaining the choice of adjustment policies. The dynamics of 
party competition shapes politicians’ calculations when choosing alternative 
consolidation strategies (Kitschelt 2001). But electoral politics is not only about parties, 
it is also about voters. Variations in public preferences have been shown to affect the 
formation of policy agendas and outcomes in the USA (Erikson et al. 2002; Kingdon 
1997). But the relationship between public opinion and the choice of fiscal 
consolidation strategies has not been systematically explored. It seems that voters do 
acquiesce to tough fiscal remedies; but whether this is in a spirit of genuine acceptance 
of their necessity, or faute de mieux, is unclear. There are indications such as in the 
work of Mulas-Granados that voters can and do punish unpalatable policies under 
certain circumstances. But as yet, we have relatively little knowledge about what those 
conditions might be, and standard analyses of ‘pocket-book voting’ do not differentiate 
between the consequences of revenue-based or expenditure-based consolidation 
policies.
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Varieties of capitalism 
In mainstream analysis of fiscal consolidation, the focus is generally on domestic 
political institutions, whether constitutional or electoral. But developing the insights 
drawn from historical institutionalism, we suggest that it is also valuable to analyse the 
constraining effects that emanate from the structure of domestic production (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999). The ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature is based on the 
centrality of the firm to production in market economies. Variations in coordination 
mechanisms and steering capacity provide the basis for differentiation between liberal 
and coordinated market economies, corresponding roughly with English-speaking 
versus Continental European economies, plus Japan; with scope also for a third, ‘state-
led’ or ‘mixed’ market economy model, taking in France and the Mediterranean 
countries (Molina and Rhodes 2007; Schmidt 2002).
Pattern of policy making and implementation are therefore deeply grounded in 
economic structure, and the patterns of state-society relationships vary accordingly, with 
implications for the way public policy has adjusted to successive waves or cycles of 
economic activity (Hall 2007). Profiles of welfare state provision and welfare reform 
can also be viewed in this light. Esping-Andersen’s work, initially grounded on analysis 
of class coalitions, came to focus more on the interactions between labour markets, state 
employment, and family formation (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999). But the deep 
linkages between the politics of production and distribution in the political economies 
of the advanced industrial societies have come to be recognized more clearly
(Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001; Iversen and Wren 1998). Policy change normally takes 
place incrementally and selectively, and there is no guarantee that pressure for change in 
one policy area or another will not produce conflictual or suboptimal outcomes (Crouch 
2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005). In the real world there are no pure models, and all 
political economies are made up of an admixture of elements. But the incentives and 
constraints facing governments as they undertake fiscal consolidation strategies are 
nevertheless likely to look rather different depending on whether the patterns of 
economic coordination fall more clearly into the liberal, coordinated, or mixed models. 
There are many ways in which governments many intervene in a country’s underlying 
growth model, that may help or hinder economic adjustment prospects. The conditions 
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shaping choice of fiscal consolidation strategy, and the consequences for employment, 
growth, and equity, are likely be different across the varieties of capitalism.
Bringing ideas back into the politics of fiscal adjustment
The dominant ideas available to decision-makers may constrain the choice set of the 
actors confronting a fiscal crisis. Economic ideas ‘provide agents with both a scientific 
and a normative account of the existing economy and polity, and a vision that specifies 
how these elements should be constructed’ (Blyth 2001, p.11). Ideas may affect policies 
through different channels, including the institutionalisation of policy paradigms and the 
rise of epistemic communities advocating specific policy solutions (Hall 1993; 1997; 
McNamara 2002). Indeed, the causal weight of ideas is likely to be greater during 
crises, particularly if a war of policy paradigms is under way about the correct diagnosis 
and appropriate solutions to a given crisis (Blyth 2002; Gourevitch 1986).
Cognitive considerations may affect the dynamics of fiscal policy in general and 
processes of budget consolidation in particular. The evolution of ideas has shaped the 
politics of taxation in different societies; and the distribution of welfare-supporting 
values changes across societies at roughly the same time (Kato 2003; Kitschelt 2001; 
Steinmo 2003). It is difficult to assess empirically whose ideas matter, when and how. 
Nonetheless, we can hypothesise that ideas may influence the adoption of alternative 
fiscal consolidation strategies by defining the range of ‘perceived legitimate change’ 
(North 2005). The dominant set of policy beliefs, like the presence of social pacts, 
affects the politics of legitimation of fiscal adjustments.
The international political economy context
Domestic sources of variation in fiscal adjustment strategies are only one part of the 
story. International political economy considerations are often overlooked, if not 
ignored altogether. Countries face external constraints which vary across space and 
time. Patterns of insertion into the international economic system are systematically 
different across countries. Nations are not equally exposed to global financial crises or 
to the pressures emanating from supranational fiscal rules of the game, and the intensity 
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of external exposure can vary over time too. This presents us with a challenge to 
integrate comparative and international economy analyses. 
Growth in international trade and increasing capital mobility has affected the viability of 
welfare states, constraining governments’ revenue-raising capacities (Scharpf and 
Schmidt 2000; Swank 2002). For example, Swank and Steinmo show that 
internationalization affects the development of tax policy in industrialised democracies, 
though in more complex ways than suggested by the globalization thesis (Swank and 
Steinmo 2002). It also influences patterns of government spending, as the ongoing 
debate over globalization and the politics of compensation suggests (Adserà and Boix 
2002; Rodrik 1998; Schulze and Ursprung 1999).
External commitments may be a powerful source of domestic policy constraint. Rules 
governing eligibility for membership of the Euro provided incentives for fiscal 
discipline in European states during the 1990s. Indeed, partisan effects appear to have 
been attenuated during these years, when all governments were increasingly constrained 
to ensure compliance with the qualifying conditions for Euro membership (Illera and 
Mulas-Granados 2008, p.161). It is not clear whether external constraints played any 
significant role in explaining the composition of adjustments. But the incentives created 
by the Stability and Growth Pact appear to have been significantly weaker after 2000 in 
constraining fiscal policy choices (Hallerberg and Bridwell 2008; Hassel 2009; 
Johnston and Hancke 2009). All this suggests the importance of further exploring the 
systematic effects of international factors on the choice of fiscal consolidation 
strategies.
In summary, we take issue with the conventional ways of analysing the politics of fiscal 
adjustment. Neither the approach based on analysing segmented episodes nor that based 
on comparing two observation points can capture the dynamic aspects of country’s 
adaptation strategies. Insofar as quantitative analyses attempt to acquire greater nuance, 
they risk engaging in conceptual stretching. We suggest that the role of organized 
interests in creating governance capacity, and the leading role of ideas, are more 
important than conventional analysis acknowledges in explaining variations in fiscal 
consolidation strategies. They cannot easily be modelled, yet they exercise a strong 
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shaping and constraining effect on governments’ strategic decisions. We have outlined 
the key elements of a political economy analysis, including domestic institutions, the 
international political economy, partisan politics, organized interests, and the role of 
ideas. We think it is important to draw on all of these to analyse commonalities and 
variation in the trajectory and composition of fiscal adjustments, ‘taking time seriously’ 
in political analysis. 
Profiling fiscal adjustments 
By 1980, most of the advanced industrial societies were experiencing the fullest strains 
of adjustment to the oil price crises of the 1970s within the then-prevailing dominant 
economic management paradigm. Many countries had incurred sizeable debts trying to 
sustain spending within a context of rapidly increasing unemployment and high 
inflation. From the early 1980s on, divergences become apparent. Monetary-based 
inflation control policies were more readily implemented by governments of the right or 
centre-right, as in Britain and the Netherlands. But not even governments of the left, 
such as the incoming socialist administration in France, were exempt from dealing with 
the new fiscal constraints (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Gourevitch 1986). 
Fiscal consolidation refers to the process by which governments attempt to put public 
finances on a sustainable path by taking a discretionary decision to reduce public 
deficits and debt levels. Change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance is a 
commonly used indicator. Following Perotti and Mulas-Granados, we focus on changes 
in the balance between revenue and expenditure (Mulas-Granados 2006; Perotti 1996). 
Most European countries converged to a balanced-budget equilibrium in the run-up to 
EMU, following up to two decades of stop-go efforts to restore sound public finances. 
This process of general convergence was achieved in the context of a remarkable 
variation in the composition of adjustments, as countries adopted different types of 
consolidation strategies to meet the demands of fiscal austerity. Based on an analysis of 
60 episodes of fiscal adjustment in Europe between 1970 and 2000, Mulas-Granados 
demonstrates that while some countries, notably Ireland, show a clear preference for 
expenditure-based adjustments, others such as Austria and Greece tend to rely on
16
revenue-based consolidations (Mulas-Granados 2006). A non-convergent convergence 
was also evident in the consolidation process that preceded the introduction of the single 
currency (European Commission 2000; von Hagen et al. 2002). Table 1 below 
summarizes Mulas-Granados’s evidence of discrete episodes of consolidation, sorted by 
type.
Table 1. Episodes of fiscal adjustment in the EU, 1970-2000
Country Episodes of fiscal consolidation No of Total
Expenditure-based Revenue-based episodes years
Austria 1992-93; 1995-98 2 5
Belgium 1987-88 1977-78; 1982-85; 1993-98 4 13
Denmark 1983-87 1992-93; 1996-97; 1999-00 4 10
Finland 1971-72; 1998-99 1975-77; 1981-82; 1984-85; 1988-89; 1995-96 7 15
France 1980-81 1976-77; 1996-98 3 7
Gernmany 1982-82 1989-90 2 4
Greece 1994-2000 1974-75; 1982-83; 1986-88; 1991-92 4 16
Ireland 1983-85; 1991-95; 1996-99 1976-77 4 13
Italy 1976-78; 1997-00 1983-84; 1991-94 4 13
Luxemb. 1982-86 1977-78; 1996-97 3 9
Netherl. 1996-97 1972-73; 1977-78; 1985-86; 1988-89; 1991-94; 1999-00 7 16
Portugal 1982-84; 1986-87 1969-70; 1992-93; 1995-98 5 12
Spain 1996-00 1992-93 2 7
Sweden 1983-84; 1996-99 1976-77; 1986-90 4 12
UK 1969-70; 1996-00 1976-78; 1980-82; 1988-89 5 15
Source: Mulas-Granados (2006)
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There is no clear consensus in the literature on the phasing and composition of 
adjustments episodes. While Mulas-Granados suggests that countries such as Greece 
and Ireland enforced significant expenditure-based consolidations during the 1990s, 
Von Hagen et al. identify revenue-led adjustments. Similarly, the European 
Commission suggests that Denmark implemented an expenditure-based retrenchment 
during the late 1980s, while Mulas-Granados claims that the adjustment was revenue-
led (Mulas-Granados 2006; von Hagen et al. 2002). Ireland’s well-known expenditure-
based adjustment in the period 1987-89 is not captured by Mulas-Granados’s
methodology. 
The diverse interpretations arise from trying to link discretionary policy choices to very 
short-term fluctuations on the structural components of the budget. A more long-term 
approach is needed to shed new light on this problem. Mulas-Granados defines ‘strategy 
type’ as the sum of the average variation of cyclically adjusted revenues and cyclically 
adjusted primary expenditures. The intuition is that the higher the value of the strategy 
type, the more expansionary is the effect of the government’s strategy on the total size 
of the government budget. We can apply this thinking to assess countries’ overall fiscal 
trajectories during the whole era of stabilisation. Figure 1 outlines the expansion or 
contraction of the public sector across European countries between 1980 and 2000. This 
confirms our intuition that Ireland is a typical case of public sector contractionary 
strategy, and Greece a typical case of public sector expansionary strategy. Ireland has 
relied on a expenditure-cutting fiscal stabilization strategy, while Greece has sought to 
bridge deficits by raising taxation. 
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Figure 1. Expansion/contraction of public spending and revenues, 1980-2000
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Economic Outlook Database. The index of expansion or 
contraction is the sum of the average variation of structural revenues and structural expenditures between 
1980 and 2000 (both revenues and expenditures are measured as percent of GDP)
Comparative case studies
Case studies are not always good for testing hypotheses. However, they are good for 
revealing missing variables in existing explanations, generating arguments and ideas, 
and dealing with causal complexity (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). Case 
selection on the dependent variable is often held to be undesirable. But we believe that 
this methodological choice is appropriate in the process of discovery, serving crucial 
exploratory and heuristic purposes (Geddes 2003, p.129). We adopt a ‘diverse case’
selection strategy (Gerring 2007), choosing Ireland as an ideal type of expenditure-led 
consolidation and Greece as a paradigmatic case of revenue-led adjustment. This means 
that we are allowing for variation in the outcome of interest, as suggested by both King 
and his colleagues and by Geddes (Geddes 2003; King et al. 1994). We also consider 
the experiences of Britain and Spain to leverage our analysis of the Irish and Greek 
cases respectively. Taken together, these four countries entail an interesting mix of 
cross-case and within-case variation of fiscal consolidation experiences.
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Ireland: expenditure-based adjustment
The fiscal trajectory of Ireland since 1980 is characterized principally by expenditure-
based adjustments. Scholars disagree on the precise phasing of adjustment periods. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Mulas-Granados identifies the periods 1983-5, 1991-5, 
1996-9 (Mulas-Granados 2003, p.21; 2006, p.28), while Alesina and Ardagna argue that 
during the 1980s, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, and 1989 were all fiscal adjustment years
(Alesina et al. 1998a, p.497). But the trend is clear: Mulas-Granados classes all three of 
the fiscal adjustment periods he identifies as based on expenditure-based episodes, and
Alesina and Ardagna similarly note the reliance on expenditure-based adjustment
(Alesina et al. 1998a, p.515; Mulas-Granados 2006, p.28). Figure 2 below shows the 
profile of revenues and expenditures in relation to GDP.1
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Figure 2. Revenue and expenditure trends in Ireland, 1980-2000 (per cent of GDP)
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Economic Outlook Database
1 Data based on GDP are often regarded as contentious in the Irish case, since there is a greater disparity 
between GDP and GNP in Ireland than in other OECD countries. But while tracing these trends in 
relation to GNP may alter the nuanced picture, the overall trajectory is relatively unchanged.
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Ireland ran double-digit deficits from 1979 to 1985, accumulating a huge government 
debt (European Commission 2000). However, from 1987 on, the country embarked on a 
process of consolidation that ended up changing the structure of Irish public finances. 
The ratio of public spending to GDP decreased substantially from 1985 to 2000, from 
53% to 32%, accompanied by a steady decline of structural revenues from 43% to 35%
of GDP. As a result, Ireland’s fiscal stance improved by around twelve points of GDP.
How can we explain this dramatic turnaround? 
Institutional fragmentation cannot readily explain either the scale of the problem 
incurred or the eventual turnaround. Ireland has a unitary state with centralized 
governmental institutions, and notwithstanding coalition governments, multiannual 
budgeting is quite recent and there is no coalition pre-commitment to performance 
targets. The Minister for Finance can exercise quite strong delegated powers. 
Explanations grounded in partisanship encounter some difficulty in classifying 
governments in Ireland, as the Labour Party is very small, there is no clear left-right 
cleavage, and the two largest parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, cluster to the centre-
right. Furthermore, the prevalence of coalition government since the late 1970s means 
that the two larger parties have each governed with Labour. The presence of a small 
liberal party, the Progressive Democratic Party, in coalition with Fianna Fáil between 
1997 and 2007, is credited with exerting a rightward influence on budgetary policy. 
Hallerberg et al. note that these latter coalition governments display rather lower
ideological distance than the Fine Gael-Labour coalitions of 1983-87 and 1994-97, or  
the Fianna-Fáil-Labour coalition of 1992-4 (Hallerberg et al. 2007, p.345). This might 
be expected to help explain budgetary discipline after 1997, but it should have increased 
coalition tensions prior to that date. Yet expenditure-based consolidations were in fact 
successfully undertaken, especially in the late 1980s, and it is in the period after 2000 
(outside the scope of the current paper) that we note the most marked trends toward 
fiscal loosening. The broad cross-class base of electoral support which all parties seek to 
maintain gives partisan explanations less traction in the Irish case than elsewhere. 
Party politics is certainly an important part of the story of fiscal consolidation in Ireland. 
Spending restraints proved difficult to impose during the lifetime of the coalition Fine 
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Gael and Labour Party government of 1983-87, as the budgetary situation worsened 
during the mid-1980s. Instead, fiscal drag drew increased revenues from the existing 
narrow but steeply graded tax base (Hardiman 2004). The sharp turnaround in fiscal 
management strategy from 1987 was undertaken by a Fianna Fáil government. This was 
a minority government: what made it possible was the commitment from the opposition 
benches by the next-largest party, Fine Gael, not to oppose fiscal retrenchment 
measures, as these incorporated many of the commitments Fine Gael had tried but failed 
to implement. Cross-party policy agreement, rather than partisanship, explains the 
adoption and implementation of spending cuts.
However, party politics is only part of the story. The legitimation of spending cuts was a 
constant problem for the coalition government of 1983-87. What made it possible for 
Fianna Fáil to undertake the same measures successfully after 1987 was the negotiation 
of a tripartite pay pact, initially a short-term crisis management measure, but 
increasingly proving its worth as a coordinating mechanism over time (Hardiman 2002). 
The Irish trade union movement, like the British, is fragmented and based on a 
combination of skills, professional unions, and large general unions. Its base is 
narrowed by the growing economic importance of US multinationals that are resistant to 
any union presence. Over the decades, governments had periodically attempted to 
induce agreement to pay pacts, with little success. The social partnership agreements 
negotiated after 1987 introduced a new governance mechanism into Irish political 
economy that was adopted by all successive governments, in which all the major 
political parties participated. The objectives of Maastricht were internalized into the 
social partnership process and created the framework for wage and inflation target-
setting right through to 2000 and beyond (Roche 2009). 
Conventional accounts of fiscal consolidation in Ireland cannot readily explain why and 
how spending controls, underpinned by an explicit commitment to a low-tax regime, 
were adopted from 1987 on. Corporate taxation had long been subject to favourable 
terms and was the basis on which surges in FDI-led growth were enabled in the 1970s 
and again in the 1990s (Barry et al. 1999). Reforms in tax administration, in line with 
OECD trends, led to a broadening of the tax base in the late 1980s. But the cuts in 
headline personal tax rates that were a key complement to this would not have been 
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undertaken, and would not have been possible without risking inflation, in the absence 
of wage moderation agreements (Barry 2009). The unions traded wage restraint for tax 
cuts, in a deal that resulted in steady increases in disposable income, even as the base 
from which provision of collective goods could be funded was eroded (Hardiman 2006). 
Notwithstanding the marked deficiencies in the Irish welfare state, and the incapacity of 
the health care system to respond adequately to demand, deep-seated suspicion of 
government capacity to deliver services efficiently, combined with tax breaks for 
private insurance, bolstered support for personal income-maximizing rather than 
service-enhancing pay pacts. A low-tax, service-poor equilibrium became deeply 
embedded in Irish political economy as the engine for growth and employment creation. 
A comparison with Britain is instructive. Both countries are liberal market economies; 
in both, a fragmented trade union structure made wage management during the 1970s 
highly conflictual. Both countries attempted strong fiscal stabilization measures around 
1980. But the profile of adjustment in Britain is rather different, as Figure 3 below 
shows.
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Figure 3. Revenue and expenditure trends in the UK, 1980-2000 (per cent of GDP)
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Economic Outlook Database
Mulas-Granados classifies Britain as resorting more frequently to revenue-based 
adjustments (1980-82, 1988-9) than to expenditure-based adjustment (1996-2000)
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(Mulas-Granados 2006, p.28). Alesina and Ardagna also view 1988 as a consolidation 
year (Alesina et al. 1998a, p.497). But what is perhaps even more striking is the very 
uneven trajectory in evidence over time. This is only in part explained by changes of 
government, because the Conservative Party held power until 1997, and the Labour 
Party which has been in government since then had pre-committed itself to the same 
spending targets as the Conservatives in order to increase its electoral credibility and to 
maintain the confidence of the financial markets. Britain has featured governments of 
long duration, the absence of coalitions, and a non-fragmented decision-making process. 
Yet a trend toward a stop-go policy style is apparent; so is a profile of mixed reliance on 
spending reductions and revenue increases. Britain shows an unusual pattern regarding 
partisanship, as Table 1 illustrates, since the Conservatives implemented two revenue-
based adjustments during the 1980s and the Labour Party introduced a spending-based 
correction during the 1990s. 
Three features of Britain’s political economy may be contrasted with the Irish 
experience outlined above. Firstly, while Britain is also a liberal market economy, the 
historical inheritance of higher levels of social protection and welfare state institutions 
meant that gravitation toward a low-revenue equilibrium was not possible. Mrs. 
Thatcher’s governments attempted to curtain spending on education, the NHS, and 
transfer payments; but despite her electoral successes, public opinion proved resistant to 
these core provisions being dismantled (Rhodes 2000). Secondly, Britain’s brief 
experiment with managing the value of sterling within the European currency system 
left it vulnerable to the exchange-rate crisis of 1992 and resistant to the prospect of the 
Euro. It was not therefore subject to Maastricht criteria and did not need to attend to the 
spending constraints this entailed. Its growing exposure to international financial 
markets, with growing capital market deregulation and the diversification of 
increasingly complex investment products, left it with incentives to curb deficits. The 
newly independent Bank of England took over inflation targeting from 1997. But the 
British government was still relatively free to mix strategies of revenue and expenditure 
based consolidation. Thirdly, trade unions in Britain could exert only weak political 
influence, which also left central government with a relatively free hand. The 
marginalization of labour under Thatcher’s early administrations was followed by the 
24
organizational fragmentation of public sector unions, leaving virtually all sectors of the 
workforce more systematically exposed than ever before to decentralized wage-setting, 
responsive to local market conditions, and with much more attenuated national 
reference points than previously (Bieler 2008). From a situation in the 1970s during 
which Ireland and Britain had well-organized but poorly coordinated trade union 
movements, Ireland moved in the late 1980s toward government-led coordination 
efforts, while Britain moved in the opposite direction toward a deliberate strategy of 
labour disorganization (Crouch 2000; Traxler et al. 2001). This meant that British 
governments did not need to rely on effective social interlocutors, and further increased 
the autonomy of government in its strategic options. 
The evolution of economic ideas also plays a role in explaining change in both the Irish 
and the British cases. In Ireland, the case for curbing public spending commitments 
came to be increasingly widely held, grounded partly in awareness of the role of the 
low-tax model in supporting its FDI-based growth potential, and partly in an acceptance 
of the argument that a large public sector is inherently a drag on growth. In Britain, the 
dispiriting experience of repeated electoral losses between 1979 and 1997 drove the 
Labour Party to undertake not only organizational modernization, but also radical 
modification of many policy commitments in a bid to reposition itself more favourably 
with the electorate. From its origins as a left of centre party, New Labour came to adopt 
many elements of neo-classical economic orthodoxies, which made it possible for it to 
accommodate an expenditure-driven adjustment by the late 1990s (Hay 1999; 
Wickham-Jones 1996).  
Greece: revenue-based adjustment
In contrast to Ireland, Greece can be regarded as a paradigmatic case of revenue-based 
consolidation. Indeed, three out of four of the episodes of fiscal adjustment that Greece 
underwent in the post-authoritarian era were based on increasing structural revenues 
(Mulas-Granados 2006, p.28). Figure 4 shows the expansionary trajectory of Greek 
public finances in the period from 1980 to 2000. The size of the public sector expanded 
by almost 60% during this period, funded by a revolution in the revenue-raising 
capacities of the state. Total revenues increased by more than fifteen points of GDP. 
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Successive Greek governments faced the challenge of having to adopt measures to 
enforce fiscal discipline. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, Greece is the European country 
which is most likely to be involved in a fiscal adjustment process. Most of these are 
based on raising revenues rather than cutting primary spending. 
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Figure 4. Revenue and expenditures trends in Greece, 1980-2000 (per cent of GDP)
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Economic Outlook Database
Partisanship should explain much of the dynamics of fiscal consolidation in Greece. The 
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK, has been the dominant political force in 
recent decades, and parties of the left tend to prefer revenue-based adjustments in order
to protect government wages, public investment, and social transfers. But the partisan 
argument is not clear-cut. The revenue-based retrenchment of 1974-75 took place 
during the conservative-led democratic transition, and the socialists implemented 
expenditure-based adjustments in the period between 1994 and 2000. Nor can the 
fragmentation of decision-making be called upon to explain these anomalies: Greece is
a unitary and highly centralized state, and governments and coalitions are not 
particularly large or short-lived.
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Greece’s fiscal trajectory is embedded in the political economic of growth, starting from 
a relatively low base in the 1970s. A relatively weak administrative capacity, and a 
fragmented and politicized set of organized economic interests, curtailed the governance 
options of parties in power. The country started out with a small tax take, poorly 
developed tax instruments, a weak tax administrative system, and low levels of 
compliance. The first socialist governments of Andreas Papandreou in the late 1970s
presided over political as well as economic stabilization, with strong public sector 
support. During the 1980s, there was strong popular demand for more public sector 
employment and welfare expansion, giving rise to the creation of new services such the
national health system in 1984. These new expenditures were met through increased 
taxation and improved tax administration. But in the 1990s, the same socialist party, this 
time led by Kostas Simitis, faced a radically different set of political economy 
constraints, both domestic and international. There was a recognition, however 
reluctantly arrived at, that the freer spending environment of the 1980s had led to 
populist excesses that needed to be curbed. This paved the way for a more modernizing 
and technocratic approach to policy-making, which was in turn externally enforced by 
the incentives embedded in the Maastricht convergence criteria.
But expenditure-based adjustments have been the exception rather than the rule in 
Greece. There is some confusion about the classification of episodes here too, and some 
studies suggest that the fiscal consolidation process of the 1990s was indeed a revenue-
based retrenchment (European Commission 2000; von Hagen et al. 2002). The 
significant consolidation effort of the late 1990s only occurred in the context of a 
singular mix of incentives, not least the sense of urgency brought about by EMU 
conditionality. Yet Greece experienced a recurrent need to resort to fresh consolidation 
measures which appeared difficult to institutionalize stably. Greece is a country that 
tends to generate high public deficits and accumulate unsustainable debts. The average 
public deficit between 1970 and 2000 was second only to Italy’s among the EU15 
(Mulas-Granados 2006, p.28).
Persistent fiscal indiscipline reflects a weak governance system arising from features of 
state structures on the one hand and the profile of organized interests on the other. As 
Featherstone argues, policy-making in Greece features a particularly intense set of 
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structural constraints which create une société bloquée, with ‘systemic weaknesses 
deriving from the institutional capacity of the state, the regime of disjointed 
corporatism, and cultural practices of clientelism and rent-seeking’ (Featherstone 2005, 
p.223). The issue is not that the formal institutions are poorly structured. The problem is
one of the government’s capacity to generate coherent policies that command sufficient 
consent among civil society, and the administrative system’s capacity to implement 
them: it is a governance problem. The Greek government is all too often entrapped in a 
stalemate bargaining game, unable to offer sufficient incentives to break deadlocks and 
overcome powerful vested interests. 
The politics of interest intermediation in Greece may be usefully contrasted with the 
Irish experience. The scope for social dialogue in Greece is limited. Party politics is 
highly confrontational both between and within parties, and clientelist electoral politics 
is well established. But civil society is weakly organized, and the trade unions are 
highly politicized. There is little scope for creating stable structures integrating 
organized interests into administrative routines of consultation and coordination. 
Structural reform initiatives are likely to encounter resistance from within the system of 
‘disjointed corporatism’. Economic policy-making is constrained by ‘the reproduction 
of a pattern of power relations relying on a weak and asymmetrically penetrated state 
apparatus’ (Lavdas 2005, p.309). Governments are obliged to undertake fiscal 
consolidation measures without the legitimating support of union and employer consent. 
This leaves open the further risk of populist lobbying from potentially disadvantaged 
sectors, and reinforces politically destabilizing clientelism as governments seek to shore 
up their electoral support base.
Post-authoritarian stabilization policies need not take this form, as a brief comparison 
between Greece and Spain reveals. These countries share common economic
development patterns, welfare state profiles, processes of modernization through 
Europeanization, and a Southern European political culture. Yet despite these 
similarities, these two countries have undertaken contrasting policy paths in many areas, 
including the management of their respective public finances. The economic policies of 
their respective left-wing governments, Greece’s PASOK and Spain’s PSOE, diverged 
markedly through the 1980s (Pagoulatos 2004). The Spanish socialist party made 
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decisive efforts to converge to the new economic orthodoxy of austerity and market 
liberalization, while the Greek socialists continued to practice outdated economic 
expansionism and populist distributionism well into the late 1980s. As a result, public 
deficits and inflation in Greece peaked during the early 1990s. Both Greece and Spain 
had relatively similar public sectors, with low ratios of expenditure to GDP, in the 
1970s. Yet as Figure 1 showed, Greece followed a more expansionary fiscal path during
the 1980s and 1990s. Even though we have shown that Greece relied on increasing 
public revenues to fund its spending ambitions, Figure 5 below shows that Greece faced 
more severe problems than Spain in successfully financing the growth and 
modernization of its welfare state, and that deficit levels constantly outstripped Spain’s, 
often by a large margin.
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Figure 5. Borrowing requirements in Greece and Spain, 1980-2000 (per cent of GDP)
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Economic Outlook
The partisanship thesis is helpful in explaining the fiscal trajectories of these two 
countries, as both PSOE and PASOK have preferred to implement revenue-led 
consolidations, while the Spanish right-wing Partido Popular (PP) enforced a 
substantive expenditure-based adjustment between 1996 and 2000. However, the 
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partisan argument cannot explain why the Spanish socialists (and indeed the Spanish 
conservatives) have been consistently more successful than their Greek counterparts in 
enforcing fiscal discipline on a permanent basis. Nor can it account for the shifts in 
PASOK’s own policy stance over time. This can only be understood by looking at the 
competition for influence within the party between ideological factions – difficult to 
capture with a single indicator of partisanship, but with far-reaching policy significance.
A comparison between Greece and Spain shows that the constitutional and 
administrative politics of budget formation only captures part of the variation in 
institutional configurations. We also need to take account of the terms on which
governments engage with powerful social actors in the process of bargaining and 
implementing fiscal adjustments. Spain enjoyed certain advantages in the form of 
highly-disciplined political parties and a pactista tradition that had successfully 
facilitated the democratic transition (Pérez-Díaz 1993). Spain was able to manage the 
transition to ‘modern’ class and interest-based civil society organization, even though 
still characterized by separate partisan affiliations, facilitating a basis for consensus-
oriented bargaining. But economic interest organization in Greece continued to be 
fragmented and highly conflictual, providing a weak base for social pacts (Avdagic et 
al. 2005).  
The role of ideas in shaping the range of feasible options was also different in Greece 
and in Spain. Greece’s adherence to high-spending economic policies during the 1980s 
was underpinned by a perception widely shared in government circles of a relatively 
weak set of domestic and external constraints on their policy choices. A dominant 
culture of national exceptionalism in Greece led to economic policies based on political 
voluntarism and ideological maximalism. In contrast, the prevailing belief structures in 
Spain created the conditions for a strong endorsement of the European project. This 
further strengthened the commitment to administrative modernization and the 
prevalence of technocratic criteria in budget formation (Pagoulatos 2004).
Contrasting deficit profiles
Looking at our four cases, Ireland in relation to Britain, and Greece in relation to Spain, 
we might also note some commonalities as well as variations in the profile of budget 
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deficits. Firstly, Figure 6 below shows Britain to be more deficit-averse, on the whole, 
than any of the other countries. This may at first seem paradoxical, given the prominent 
place of deficit targeting in the EMU project, since Britain is the only one of our four 
cases to stand outside the European exchange rate system and the Euro. A permanent 
commitment to lower deficits is attributable, rather, to its situation as a hub of 
international finance. Formal independence for the Bank of England after 1997 
intensified but did not fundamentally alter these features. Growing political demands for 
welfare-oriented spending as Labour bedded down in office proved hard to match with 
revenue increases. Despite recourse to so-called stealth taxes, Britain’s revenue-
enhancing capabilities have not kept pace with spending expectations, and the current 
financial crisis finds Britain exposed to a high deficit, with plummeting revenues failing 
to match spending commitments that are consistently higher than any of our other three 
countries. But monetary and exchange rate autonomy also permits greater autonomy in 
its fiscal response to international crisis than is available to the Eurozone countries. 
Gordon Brown’s Labour government undertook a classic Keynesian fiscal stimulus 
programme, with tax cuts and spending increases, to boster demand and support 
employment. Britain had gained a competitive advantage from the gradual depreciation 
of sterling relative to the Euro during the 2000s. A large primary deficit causes it fewer 
worries than would be the case for Ireland, for example, where downgrading by 
international credit rating agencies limits the scope of feasible policy choice and 
constrains the set of ideas deemed appropriate to respond to the crisis.
As we have already noted, among our four cases Greece displays the weakest capacity 
to manage deficits due to its institutional and administrative deficiencies. Ireland 
exhibits the most marked fluctuation between failures and successes, Spain the least.
Our comments about the role of social pacts in facilitating adjustments in Spain and 
Ireland are reflected in the trends toward sharply reduced deficits in the periods in 
which pacts are in effect. In Ireland, a particularly strong contrast is apparent between 
the pre-pact and post-pact situation (assisted of course by especially strong growth 
between 1994 and 2000). Spain’s especially sharp improvement after 1993 is similarly 
attributable in large measure to improved governance capabilities arising from 
coordination of labour market interests. 
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Figure 6. Evolution of budget deficits, 1970-2007 (per cent of GDP)
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Economic Outlook Database
Policy implications: are expenditure-based adjustments better?
Fiscal consolidation is a subject of enduring political interest, and policy implications
have been drawn from past experience, not least by the European Commission itself, 
that are intended to guide future government choices. The normative agenda has been 
dominated by the debate surrounding expansionary fiscal adjustments (EFAs). The 
received wisdom is that ‘corrections that are mainly based on current primary 
expenditure, in particular the government wage bill, are more likely to be successful 
than corrections relying on higher revenues or cuts in investment expenditure’ 
(European Commission 2007, p.196). This claim, drawn from the work of Perotti, 
Alesina and Ardagna, and others, is that expenditure-based adjustments, that is, 
spending cuts to secure deficit reduction, have an expansionary effect on economic 
growth, without incurring adverse electoral consequences. Thus the case for 
32
expansionary fiscal adjustments has acquired the status of a ‘policy paradigm’ (Hall 
1993). How persuasive are these arguments about how best to secure successful 
consolidations? Are expenditure-based measures really both economically and 
electorally optimal? 
We believe that inferring lessons from prior consolidation experiences is problematic at 
best and misleading at worst. We have argued that some of the factors that best explain 
outcomes are deeply embedded in a country’s political economy and that national 
models are not readily amenable to export. National development paths and national 
patterns of interest intermediation are path dependent and time-bound. Firstly, spending 
cuts needs to be supported by wage moderation and the defusion of distributive conflict 
to legitimate the strategy, and this in turn is likely to mean that the government needs
viable interlocutors among organized employer and union interests. Secondly, some of 
the factors that have clearly shaped past stabilization experiences go beyond the control 
of national governments and are no longer available in the current international political 
economy. Chief among these is the role played by devaluation in securing stable 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation (Alesina et al. 1998a, p.516). Ireland’s 
experiences in the late 1980s have been cited as a classic instance of non-Keynesian 
EFA (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990). But the fiscal disciplines alone did not secure 
renewed growth. The combination of wage moderation with devaluation, against a 
backdrop of international economic recovery, increased competitiveness, improved the 
terms of trade, and boosted export opportunities (Barry 1991). This is rather different 
from the readily exportable policy remedy it is sometimes represented to be. Thirdly, 
expenditure-based cuts may have made sense as a credibility-boosting strategy against
the backdrop of widespread credit market imperfections during the 1980s and 1990s. 
But the current crisis has been preceded by a long period of low interest rates and credit 
expansion. The value of the strategy as a credibility-securing mechanism to prepare the 
way for future growth is now, at best, questionable.
The mechanisms through which a strategy of EFA is said to work tend to radically 
underestimate the importance of political factors to make it work, especially the need 
for government to secure the legitimacy of its strategy. Procedural rules and the phasing 
of elections are not the only or even the most important political variables that matter 
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(European Commission 2007). Spending cuts are said to secure credibility by signalling 
a commitment to economic orthodoxy. Tight control over spending would be expected 
to result in better resource allocation and lower interest rates, which would trigger 
consumption and investment booms through non-Keynesian channels. But the 
relationship between economic discipline and credibility is problematic (Dellepiane-
Avellaneda 2005). Not all expenditure-based efforts are credible, especially if they 
provoke electoral resistance and societal conflict. They may even risk incurring
credibility losses, not gains, through undermining coalition support and increasing 
political contestation, leading in some cases to the breakdown of the governing coalition 
– precisely the experience of Argentina in 2001. The political sources of credibility, 
including the trade-off between macroeconomic consistency, coalition cohesiveness,
and public opinion support for stabilisation policies, need to be kept clearly in view. 
The political dimension of some economic variables is also overlooked in the literature. 
For example, devaluation of the exchange rate often preceded successful stabilizations, 
easing the realignment of relative prices and especially of wages. But devaluations also 
played a key political role by allowing governments to accommodate distributive
struggles: devaluation and the inflation associated with it have a smoothing effect 
during the transition. Most European countries can no longer do this. Any alternative 
EU-centred strategy would require the development of a redistributive capability to 
complement its monetary policy, which would be bound to be severely contested at both 
national and European levels. The political sustainability of EMU itself may be called 
into question, particularly if parties and voters were to blame Brussels for unpopular 
adjustment policies (McKay 1999).
Advocates of EFAs argue that adjustments which target primary expenditures are not 
necessarily punished at elections, and that adjustment strategies based on cutting 
spending rather than raising taxes may work best for political sustainability. The key 
issue here is how best to assess the political consequences of expenditure-cutting 
adjustment. If governments do not in fact pay a heavy electoral price, it may be that 
voters reward the credit and consumption booms that often follow a successful 
stabilization plan rather than the fiscal strategy itself, so the timing of elections becomes 
crucial. It may be that a perception of crisis induces a passive if grudging acquiescence 
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to unpleasant policy choices, where no alternative seems available. In either case, the 
success of a stabilization plan is a function of credibility, which needs be generated 
through the mobilization of costly institutional and political resources. It is a high-risk 
electoral strategy that can come unstuck at many points. The fact that many 
governments (even right-wing coalitions) continue to avoid expenditure-driven 
adjustments suggests that fiscal conservatism is less attractive than suggested by the 
literature on consolidation. And more recent empirical evidence suggests that electoral 
costs associated with expenditure-based adjustments may be more severe and more 
common than had previously been recognized (Mulas-Granados 2004).
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that conventional analyses of fiscal consolidation, based either on 
segmenting episodes and analysing them as discrete observations, or comparing budget 
profiles at two points in time, are less than satisfactory. They fail to capture the dynamic 
and path-dependent evolution of fiscal consolidation strategies. Much detail is lost as 
‘country fixed effects’. We have made the case for a new approach to thinking about 
fiscal consolidation that locates politics in time: we think much can be gained by 
looking at pathways to consolidation rather than episodes of change. We wish to look 
beyond the conventional forms of institutional and partisan explanations, and to renew 
interest in the core issues of political economy. Among these are the role of interests 
and ideas, the domestic politics underpinning the legitimation of fiscal adjustment 
policies, and the changing context of the international political economy.
Our case studies featured a comparison between Ireland as the most pronounced case of 
expenditure-based consolidation, and Greece as the clearest instance of revenue-based 
adjustment. We also considered the cases of Britain and Spain to provide variation 
within each case-study type. These exploratory but theoretically well-grounded 
investigations convince us of three key points. Firstly, the politics of interest 
intermediation is vitally important in securing stable consolidation. Where it is possible 
to negotiate social pacts to secure wage moderation and to legitimate the adjustment 
strategy, it is likely to be more durable, as in Ireland and Spain. Britain’s governance 
mechanisms are more unbalanced as they rely more heavily on links with employer and 
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financial interests than with the representation of union interests. This reduces the need 
for wage-managing negotiations, but increases the need to attend to electoral 
legitimation, which is arguably one of the major challenges faced by the Labour Party in 
power during the 2000s. Where interest intermediation is weakly institutionalized, 
politicized and conflictual, as in Greece, the destabilizing potential is significant.
Secondly, changes in the ideas and policy paradigms in official circles condition 
governments’ perceptions of feasibly policy options. These change over time in each 
country, but they are not uniform at any one time and may be the subject of contestation 
and factional competition within governing parties themselves. We have noted that 
Spanish policy debates feature a reasonably coherent account of the Europeanizing and 
modernizing process, consistent with a revenue-increasing but fiscally prudent strategy. 
Irish political circles, having experienced partisan conflict within the governing 
coalition over the need for expenditure cuts during the 1980s, thereafter adopted a quite 
widely legitimated view of the need for expenditure-restraining priorities. In Britain, the 
Labour Party underwent a long-drawn-out adjustment of its ideological orientation, such 
that its initial commitment upon its election in 1997 was to implement the Conservative 
Party’s budget projections. In Greece, priorities and objectives originating in wider 
European debates did not secure a legitimate foothold. This resulted in a higher level of 
ideological contestation over policy options than elsewhere.
Thirdly, we argue that the importance of the international dimension has been 
systematically underestimated in conventional analyses. Individual countries’ strategic 
choices are shaped by the stage of the international business cycle. The option of 
devaluation to ease a consolidation strategy proved crucial for both economic and 
political reasons in the era prior to European Monetary Union. This is no longer 
available to Eurozone members, and is much costlier to other countries too, in the 
context of the internationalization of financial services and increased reliance on 
transnational financial products. And finally, the manner in which national economies 
are embedded in the international economic system shapes their evolving development 
models and growth strategies, in ways that are rarely conceptualized let alone modelled 
in conventional analyses.
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The current global economic crisis is provoking a dramatic deterioration in
governments’ fiscal positions. Substantial budget consolidation will be unavoidable in 
most industrial democracies (OECD 2009). We have shown that the ‘lessons from 
successful consolidations’ are less straightforward than often suggested. Two main 
arguments have been highlighted. The first is that international conditions that 
facilitated fiscal consolidation in the past are no longer present, and without the option 
of sharp devaluation, the pain of adjustment may be both politically and economically 
unmanageable. The second is that the fiscal consolidation literature has overlooked core 
issues in domestic political economy, including the role of interest representation, 
political legitimacy, and policy contestation. Without bringing politics back into the 
frame, the analysis of what would work and what would not work in fiscal consolidation 
policies is unlikely to deliver plausible policy advice.    
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